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RATIFICATION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ESTATES
OF DECEASED PERSONS: TOWARD
UNIFORMITY IN UNITED STATES ESTATE
PLANNING
I. INTRODUCTION
At the close of the Sixteenth Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law,' delegates from thirty-three member states
2
unanimously approved a draft Convention on the Law Applicable to
Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons (the Convention).
3  
The
Convention is the product of over ten years of consideration and three
years of bargaining and preliminary negotiations within the Hague,
resulting in precisely structured concessions between the civil law countries
and the common law nations.
4 
This Note will focus on the advantages
1. October 3-20, 1988. The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an
intergovernmental organization based in the Hague, Netherlands. "[Ilts prpose is to work for
the progressive unification of the rules of private international law." van Loon, Towards A
Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, in HAGUE
YEARBOOK F INTERNAnONAL LAW 270 (Kiss & Lammers eds. 1988); Robertson, International
Succession Law: A Co-ordinated Approach?, 34 J.L. SocY Scar. 377, 378 (1989). It seeks
to integrate the conflict of laws rules that are employed in member states and to a lesser degree,
as a result of the Conference's influence, throughout the world. See Reese, The Hague
Conference on Private International Law: Some Observations, 19 INT'L LAw. 881 (1985).
2. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
beurg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. Hague Conference on Private International
Law: Convention on the Law Applicable to the Estates of Deceased Persons and the Final Act
of the Sixteenth Session, 28 I.L.M. 146 (1989) [hereinafter Hague Confrrence on Succeasion].
3. Id
4. Scoles, Planningfor the Multinational Estate, PROB. & PROP., May-June 1989, at 59.
Although the Conference delegates felt the overwhelming need for uniform rales, there was
great difficulty in negotiating rales that would accommodate the policies and concems of the
delegates' constituencies. Id Most people feel strongly that their views on this personal area
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that a United States citizen may derive from the Convention.
Occasions arise in which the instructions of a testator who has links
with several legal systems are defeated because her will was made in a
form not permitted by the particular legal system governing the matter.5
The common goal of the delegates of the Convention was "to address the
need for practical, predictable rules [for determining] the applicable law in
order to avoid the costly confusion and delay incident to settling estates of
decedents who die leaving assets in different countries."6 Generally
speaking, the Convention was primarily intended to provide uniform law
applicable to the distribution of assets owned by the deceased7 that would
pass by intestacy' or by will.' It does not apply to inter vivos transfers 0
or assets that pass outside the probate estate." Additionally, the Conven-
of the law are both superior and very much an integral part of the fabric of their society.
Interestingly, although there were delegates frotm all over the world, the central distinctions
which needed to be harmonized were within the European states. See Robertson, supra note
1, at 380.
5. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, INTERNATIONA. CONVENTIONS IN THE FIELD OF
SUCCnSSION (Explanatory Documentatios Prepared for the Commonwealth Jurisdictions) 4
(1980) [hereinafter Explanatory Documentation].
6. See Scoles, supra note 4, at 58. In the past, the basic inquiries as to who the decedent's
heirs are and what their share will be in the decedent's estate have proved to be quite onerous
to answer because of the skepticism in ascertaining which nation state's law would contribute
the answer. Id. Choice of law issues are, therefore, critical in dealing with the variations in
the indefeasible shares of spouses and children, in addition to dealing with modifications in the
intestate share of family members. Id.
7. Id.
8. Intestacy is the "condition of dying without having made a valid will, or without having
disposed by will of a part of [the deceased's] property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (5th
ed. 1979).
9. "A 'will' is generally defined as an instrument by which a person makes a disposition of
his property, to take effect after his death, and which by its own nature is ambulatory and
revocable during his lifetime." Id. at 1433.
10. See infra notes 147-50. An inter vivas transfer is "a transfer of property during the life
of the owner." Id. at 737.
11. Article I provides:
2. The Convention does not apply to
a. the form of dispositions of property upon death;
b. capacity to dispose of property upon death;
c. issues pertaining to matrimonial property;
d. property rights, interests or assets created or transferred otherwise than by
succession, such as in joint ownership with right of survival, pension plans,
insurance contracts, or arrangements of a similar nature.
Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 1. In this way, the formal requirements
of a will are left to existing law. Id. Roughly all states of the United States have existing
statutes with alternative validating references which validate a will executed in accordance with
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tion mandates rules for the disposition of international law cases and does
not concern itself with local law or solely interstate cases between the
states of the United States. i" Therefore, the conflicts rules of the fifty
states regarding interstate cases remain in effect.
Specifically, "[t]he [C]onvention identifies the law applicable to the
succession of property at the death of United States citizens who die while
living abroad
3 
for an extended time for business, personal or retirement
reasons; and of United States citizens who, while remaining in the United
States, own assets abroad; or of former United States citizens who
emigrate."" Further, it affects citizens of different countries intending to
live in or immigrate to the United States, as well as outsiders solely
owning assets in the United States."s
Three underlying policies provide the basis for each of the provisions
of the draft Convention:
First, that owners of property should be able to control the
disposition and select the applicable law to the maximum extent
the law of the place where it is executed or the state where the deceased had his domicile at
the time of execution or death. Scoles, supra note 4, at 59. Likewise, interest in joint
tenancies, joint and survivorship bank accounts, and insurance are left to existing law and not
reached by the Convention. Id
Upon ratification, the Convention becomes a uniform law and is not dependent upon
reciprocal provisions in the state whose law is to be applied under the Convention. 1,d
12. Article 21 of the Hague Conference on Succession provides: "A Contracting State in
which different systems of law or sets of rules of law apply to sucessmion shatt not be bound
to apply the rules of the Convention to conflicts solely between the laws of such different
systems or sets of rules of law." ld. art. 21, at 151. Even where not endorsed, great deference
is given worldwide to the Conventions, and moreover, their impact unquestionably has an
extreme influence on courts and legislators. Reese, supra note 1, at 885. "This influence is
not limited to states that ae members of the Conference. It extends throughout the world and
undoubtedly has [a significant] effect upon the thinking of persons in developing countries in
the area of conflict of laws." Id
13. When Ameticas do not designate an alternative, it is presupposed that they would elect
to retain their ties with their American state until they become "substantially integrated" in the
foreign populace where they reside. Memorandum from Eugene F. Scoles, U.S. Delegate,
Hague Conference on Private International Law on Succession to John Wallace, Director,
Probate and Trust Division RPPT, ABA (Sept. 18, 1989) (discussing the Hague Conference on
Suceession) [hereinafter Scoles memorandum I].
14. 1d The Convention deals with concerns of citicens, immigrants, and visitors; concerns
that are deeply imbedded in the legal concepts and attitudes of the nation states involved. 1d.
15. 1d. With respect to foreigners emigrating to the United States, a presumption exists in
favor of them retaining their ties with the country of their nationality until they become
"substantially integrated" in America. If their intention is to become United States citicens,
however, then they are deemed to be integrated as quickly as is feasible. 1d. at 2.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
consistent with shared public policy. Second, that the same ought
to determine both the persons who succeed to the estate and the
shares they receive in the decedent's estate even though the assets
are located in different countries. The estate should be treated as
a unit. Third, that the nation having the predominant interest in
the decedent's family affairs should determine any limits on
testation for protection of the family.
16
Section II of this Note examines the historical problems associated
with foreign wills and the disposition of foreign assets. Section m outlines
past attempts to remedy these problems and section IV discusses the major
operative provisions of the 1988 Conference, as well as specific matters
that may cause concern. Finally, section V concludes that adoption of the
Uniform International Will would be extremely advantageous to American
families.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Dating back to the nineteenth century, the administration of foreign
wills presented vexing issues for English courts. Bremer v. Freeman"
and In the Goods of Raffenel" both illustrate the historical dilemmas with
foreign wills and choice of law rules." The courts, in both cases, held
that wills executed in the English form by English citizens domiciled in
France were invalid.
2
' In Bremer, a will effectuated in the English form
by an English woman domiciled in France was held to be ineffective in
England.
2
' The court in Raffenel, following Bremer, held a will invalid
as to English assets because it was executed in France in the form imposed
16. Id. To the degree that the owner's classification does not govern, "the law which
governs the succession of assets at death should [accordingly] be the law of the place where the
decedent's personal and family life was centered, for example, one's domicile." Id. The term
"domicile" is not used functionally throughout Europe. Consequently, the delegates adopted
the term "habitual residence" as the primary reference which, while undefined in the
convention, bears the name implication as domicile. Id.
17. See Fratcher, The Uniform Probate Code and the lnternational Will, 66 MICH. L. REv.
469, 469 & n.l (1968) (id. In the Goods of Raffenel, 3 SW. & TR. 49, 164 Eng. Rep. 1190




21. See Stevens, The Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of the International
Will, RAL PROP., PROB. & Ti. J. 293, 293 & n.2 (1976) (citing Bremer v. Freeman, 10 Moore
306, 14 Eng. Rep. 508 (P.C. 1857).
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by English law.
22 
At the time, English law mandated that a will relating
to movables must be governed by the law of the testator's domicile at the
time of death, while immovables were to be governed by the law of the
situs.
2 
Therefore, the testator in Raffenel would have required two wills
to devise proficiently immovable property' in England and bequeath
movable property" in France.
The historical disparities pertaining to authenticity and legitimacy are
stressed by the two points of view that exist within the common law
system.
6 
Some common law jurisdictions require witnessed written wills
based on the English Statute of Frauds,
27 
whereas the English Wills Act
of 1837 regulates the remaining jurisdictions.' Under the common law
rules, neither the place of execution nor the testator's domicile or
nationality at the time of execution bear on the will's validity. Thus, a
"will disposing of an interest in land must be in the form prescribed by the
law of the place where the land is situated; a will disposing of movables
must be in the form prescribed by the law of the testator's domicile at the
time of his death."'
These common law distinctions, however, are minor in comparison
to those that exist between the common law and the civil law.' The civil
law acknowledges three different types of wills: the holographic will, the
public (open) will, and the mystic (closed) will.
3
' The holographic will
22. Fratcher, supra note 17, at 469. French law requires a notary present upon execution.
Id.
23. Id. at 471 & n.9 (citing English Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., ch. 26, § 9 (1837),
as amended, Wills Amendment Act, 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 24, § 1 (1852)).
24. Devise refers to "[a] testamentary disposition of laInd or realty" or "imovables."
BLACK's LAW DicnoINARY 407 (5th ed. 1979)
25. To "bequeath" is to give personal property or "movables" by will to another. Id. at 145.
26. For a discussion on common law rules of validity, see Note, The Uniform International
Will: The Next Step in the Evolution of Testamentary Disposition, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 317, 320-21
(1988); see Fratcher, supra note 17, at 471.
27. Fratcher, supra note 17, at 471 & n.8 (citing English Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car.
2, ch. 3, § 5 (1677)). "These jurisdictions require signature by or for the testator and
subscription in his presence by three witesses." Id.
28. Id. at 471 & n.9 (citing English Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vit., ch. 26. § 9 (1837),
as amended Wilts Act Amendment Act, 15 & 16 Vit., ch. 24, § 1 (1852)). "These
jurisdictions require that the testator sign at the fat of the will and that two present witnesses
acknowledge the signature and contemporaneously subscribe." Id. at 471-72.
29. Id. at 471.
30. Note, supra note 26, at 321.
31. Keramey, The International Wills Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 613, 615-16 (1984); see
also Note, supra note 26, at 321.
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must be handwritten and signed by the testator, without the need for any
witnesses or a notary.
32 
The public will is orally declared by the testator
in the presence of at least one witness and a notary, who transcribes it into
written form.
3 
The mystic will is sealed in some form of container or
envelope and is attested to by the testator in the presence of a notary and
at least one witness.' The civil law rules as to choice of law are, in
comparison to the previously stated common law rules,
5 
uncomplicated
and more coherent.' A will is valid, under civil law, if it was executed
in a form authorized at the time of execution by the law of the place of
execution.
37 Additionally, a will that meets the formal requirements of
the testator's law of nationality at the time of execution will be held
valid' and a subsequent acquisition of property or a later change of
domicile will not affect the validity of the will.
39 A will executed under
particular common law rules, however, is defective under the civil law.'
The common law rules regarding situs and the last intended domicile of the
testator, for example, are not recognized under the civil law.
4
"
The difference between the civil law and common law requirements
for wills has caused much confusion, as is evidenced by the laws of the
United States.'
2 
This confusion has led to the courts' tendency to reach
arbitrary results in probate proceedings.
3 
The consequence in a structure
32. Kearney, supra note 31, at 615-16.
33. Id.
34. Id
35. See supra note 26-29 and accompanying text. The common law characterizes movable
property as governed by the law of the testator's domicile, and immovable property an goveened
by the law of the situs. Id.
36. Note, supra note 26, at 321.
37. Id. Civil law also takes the opinion that the situs of property is inconsequential. Id.
Additionally, the civil law does not make a distinction as to the law governing the disposition
of movable and immovable property. Id.; see also Fratcher, supra note 17. at 478.
38. Kearney, spra note 31, at 615-16.
39. Fratcher, supra note 17, at 477-78. The legal situation is "fixed" upon execution of the
will. Id. Therefore, the formal validity of the will not affected by inconsequential occurrnces.
Id.
40. See id. at 477.
41. Id.
42. Id at 322. American jurisdictions haphazardly have chosen and combined the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the English Wills Act, and the civil law. Id.; see
Kearney, supra note 31, at 615-16.
43. Keamey, supra note 31, at 615.
Whether there should be two or three witnesse to a will, or whether these witnesses
mast sign the will, both in the presence of the testator and of the other witnesses,
[Vol. 12
1990] HAGUE CONFERENCE & U.S. ESTATE PLANNING 183
such as the United States is a melange of formal requirements among the
states that often frustrates the testator's intentions." American jurisdic-
dons aimlessly select criteria based on differing or combined aspects of the
civil law and the common law.
45 
The result is an assortment of different
forms that may often defeat the intent of the testator. A court may, for
example, refuse to admit the will to probate, resulting in a declaration of
intestacy.
4
Insofar as they operate to thwart testamentary intent, both the present
common law and civil law choice of law rules serve no practical function
and seem to tolerate much abuse.
7 
Conceivably, a uniform international
agreement on choice of law rules, if universally acknowledged, would be
a logical, intelligent approach to administering foreign wills."
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RECOGNIZE
CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES
International endeavors to reconcile existing choice of law approaches
in the area of intestate succession ("succession") commenced many years
ago.'
9 
In the 1920s, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
marked a futile attempt in this area.s Further, in 1955, a convention
unsuccessfully sought to harmonize the dissimilarities between domicile
or whether the testator must make a special kind of oral declaration are mattets of
custom more than of logic.
Id.
44. Id. For example, witnesses to a Pennsylvania will are not required to sign the will if the
testator has signed. Id. at 615 & n.10 (citing DEcEDENTS, ESTATES & FiDuctAtuis, 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1975)). No other jurisdiction within the United States has
an analogous requirement. ii at 615 & n. It (citing Reese, American Wills Statutes: 1, 46 VA.
L. REV. 613, 621-22 (1960)).
45. Nots, supra note 26, at 322. For example, it was held that the will of a New York
testator, which was invalid under New York law when made because it was not signed by
witnesses, became operative when the testator changed his domicile to Pennsylvania, where
witnesses are not required to sign the will. In re Beaumont's Estate, 216 Pa. 350, 65 A. 799
(1907).
46. Note, supra note 26, at 322.
47. See Fratcher, supra note 17, at 478. "What possible good is served by a decision of an
English coart that a will of property in England is void because it was executed in the form
prescribed by English law?" lId
48. Id.
49. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 5.
50. Id.
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and nationality as choice of law bases." The Hague Conference
delegates grew increasingly interested in the subject, however, as the
mobility of people and assets continued to escalate. Thus, in 1961, the
Convention on Conflict of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary
Dispositions (the Wills Convention) was successfully promulgated.
2 
The
Wills Convention validated wills that complied with the internal law of
either the place of execution, the testator's nationality at the time of
execution or death, the place of the testator's habitual residence at
execution or death, or the situs of immovable assets.
3 
The Wills
Convention set forth circumstances establishing the will's validity
notwithstanding the situs of the court.' Under the Wills Convention, in
order for a will to be legitimate, its validity must be proven in its country
of origin. This specification tended to generate obstacles related to alien
forms and foreign languages, thereby frustrating the testator's intent.
55
Moreover, the Wills Convention did not settle the procedural and
administrative concerns relating to issues of proof.
5 6 
Consequently,
American attorneys were likely to be faced with grave problems, such as
the possibility of the will's being rejected.
7 
This would seem to
circumvent the Convention's objective of furthering the goal of favor
testamenti" that developed in the post-World War II era.
9
In 1961, the International Institute for Unification of Private Law
51. Id.
52. Id. American conflict of laws cases concerning decedent's estates have long been a
source ofconfusion a d skepticism. Id Resultingly, foreign attorneys, notaries and courts have
tended to withstand collaboration of common law concepts of succession i American law. Id
The United States government's non-participation in international attempts to decide issues of
private law has intensified this defiance. Id.
53. Fratcher, supra note 17, at 480-81.
54. Kearney, supra note 31, at 618.
55. Id.
56. Id. For example, if the Wills Convention were in force in the United States, an attorney
seeking probate of a foreign will on the basis of domicile of the testator in that country could
be req ared to prove that the testator, at the time of death, had complied with the requireteets
of establishing domicile under the law of the foreign country. Id.
57. Id. Additionally, the United States ent an "observer" delegation, although not formally
a member state of the Hague Conference. See Nadelmonn, The Formal Validly of Wills and
the Washington Convention 1973 Providing the Farm of an International Will, 22 AM. J. Comp.
L 365, 367-68; see also Frather, sapra note 17, at 480 & n.50 (American observers
"influtenced" th  form of the Convention).
58. Favor testament is a general rule in conflicts favoring the validity of a will. BLACK'S
LAW IcrToNARY 548 (5th ed. 1979).
59. Nadelmann, supra note 57, at 365-68 (goal offvor testameni advanced by the Hague
Convention); see Note, supra note 26, at 324.
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(UNIDROIT) was formed.
6
" UNIDROIT established a Committee of
Experts who were charged with developing an international will form."'
As recently as 1964, the United States became a member of UNIDROIT
and contributed in its preliminary efforts.? In 1973, the United States
hosted the Diplomatic Conference on Wills, which was held in Washing-
ton, D.C. (the Washington Convention).' The central complication in
designing a uniform law yielding international validity for wills was the
vast diversity of the national rules governing the making of wills" for the
differences were of such great magnitude that the delegates could not
consolidate existing forms." Rather, the delegates decided to employ a
well-defined innovative form:"
The International Will, therefore, does not affect the freedom of
a testator to select any other kind of will. What it does do is to
provide an alternate way of making a will in every country which
becomes Party to the Washington Convention and to provide a
number of advantages over all other forms of wills.
67
The major provisions are that: the will may be in any language, but
it must be in writing; the testator must affirmatively proclaim it to be her
will in the presence of two witnesses and a person "authorized" to act in
association with an international will; the testator must sign or acknowl-
edge her name in the presence of the witnesses and the authorized person;
the testator must sign her name at the end of the will and at the bottom of
every page; and the witnesses and the authorized person must certify in the
presence of the testator." Failure to comply with these restrictions annuls
60. Note, supra note 26, at 325.
61. See Hall, Towards a Uniform Law of Wills: The Washington Convention 1973,23 INT'L
& Comp. L.Q. 851, 853 n.6 (1974).
62. Kearney, supra note 31, at 619. Since then, the United States has sent representatives
to all of the plenary sessions. Reese, supra note 1, at 881.
63. Diplomnatic Confonce on Wills: Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Fore of
an International Will, 12 T.L.M. 1298 (1973), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 385-17, 99th Cong., 2d
Seas. 28 (1986) [hereinafter Washington Conference). For a cormplete disctssion on the
Washington Conference, see generally Hall, smpra note 61; Kearey, supra note 31; Note,
supra note 26, at 326.
64. Kearney, supra note 31, at 619.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see Plantard, Eoplanatory Report on the Convention Providing a Uniform Law in
the Form of the International ill, UNIDROiT 35 (1974).
67. Kearney, supra note 31, at 619.
68. Beckman, The International wit 113 TR. & EST. 71 (1974).
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the will with respect to its international status. However, it may possibly
retain its validity as a local will.
69 A will achieves international status by
a certificate administered by the "authorized person," asserting that the will
was executed in conformity with the formalities set forth in the Washington
Convention."
Thus, the objective of the Washington Convention "was to establish
a uniform international will form which would be recognized in signatory
countries
7
' without regard to the testator's nationality, residence, or
domicile, the location of the assets, or whether or not the form complied,
when it was written, with the law of the place of execution."' Non-
signatory states would acknowledge the will form's lawful effect on the
same foundation as any other foreign will.
73 
Thus, "[t]h form would
complement not supplant, existing will forms."
74
The delegates of the Washington Convention accomplished their two
main aims." The first was to afford testators the opportunity to create an
international will in ajurisdiction in which the Washington Convention was
effective.
76 
The second was "to ensure the recognition of an international
will in all signatory States as a matter of local law.""
IV. THE 1988 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION
The 1988 Conference on Succession is structured in five parts or
chapters and each chapter is subdivided into articles. Chapter 1 sets out
69. S. Doc. No. 385-17, 99th Cong., 2d Ses. 3 (1986) (Dep't of State Letter of Submittal
to the President).
70. Id. at 4. Each jurisdiction was to choose the classes of people who are to be
"authorized." See Keaney, supra note 31, at 630. In the United States, all attorneys in good
standing would be denoted as "authorized" within the meaning of the Convention. See id at
630 (stating that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws epressed
the "pragnmtic reasons" for this rule); UNIF. PROB. CODE, Pt. 10, prefatory note at 178, 180-81
(1982).
71. A signatory is a "nation which is a party to a treaty." BLACK'S LAW DITONARY 1239
(5th ed. 1979).
72. Note, supra note 26, at 327.
73. Id. at 327 n.112 (citing Brandon, UK Accession to the Wills Convention, 32 INT'L &
CotwC. L.Q. 742, 745 (1983) (adding that such recognition is still preconditional on other
factors)).
74. Note, supra note 26, at 327 & n. 113 (citing S. Doc. No. 385-17,99th Cong.,2d Sess. 3
(1986)) (emphasis added).
75. Id at 328. See generally Keamey, supra note 31, at 628.
76. Note, supra note 26, at 328-29.
77. Id. This goal was quite significant because it established an enforcement mechanism for
the Convention. Id
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the scope of the Convention, namely, to determine the law applicable to the
estates of deceased persons. It is important to recognize that it does not
apply to the form of testamentary dispositions, as embodied in the 1961
Wills Convention. Chapter 2 is the heart of the Convention, as it sets out
the rules for determining the applicable law. Chapter 3 contains provisions
about agreements as to succession (pactes successoraux). The fourth and
fifth chapters cater to commorientes, where two or more persons, each of
whom has rights in the other's estate, die simultaneously.
A. Chapter 2
Articles 3, 5, 6, and 7 are the leading provisions of the Convention.78
Article 3 is the essence of the Convention, insofar as it provides a
homogeneous procedure for ascertaining which state's law applies in the
absence of testamentary direction. Articles 5 and 6 interpret the preroga-
tive of the estate owner to select the choice of law to administer the
succession of her estate." Article 7 prescribes the breadth of the
Convention's use as to assets and issues.' 0
Essentially, article 3 is the result of an understanding among the
differing preferences regarding basic choice of law, that is, nationality or
domicile." Article 3 concerns the "no conflict" situation where "the
citizen has [her] home and nationality in the same place but owns assets
abroad."
82 
Article 3(2) creates a presumption wherein the law of the place
78. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 2.
79. Id.
t0. I whichever law is applicable under the Convention, it governs the determination of
hens and legatees, respective shares and obligations imposed on them by the deceased,
disinheritance accounting for gifts and advancement, and etc. See id.; see ifra note 97.
8t. Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 3. The Conference delegates
explicitly rejected the concept of nationality as the 'single connecting factor" and, additionally,
could not acquiesce on a particular meaning of domicile. Id. "It was accepted that domicile
contained elements of home, family focus, [and] intention to stay permanently or indefinitely
...[however,] there was no agreement on the weight to attach to factors of intention as
opposed to the physical facts of residence, property, etc." Id. Rohertson, supra note 1, at 379.
82. Article 3 provides:
1. Succession is governed by the law of the State in which the deceased at the time
of his death was habitually resident, if he was then a national of that State.
2. Succession is also governed by the law of the State in which the deceased at the
time of his death was habitually resident if he had been resident there for a period
of no less than five years immediately preceding his death. However, in exception-
al circumstances, if at the time of his death he was manifestly morn closely
conected with the State of which he was then a national, the law of the state
applies.
3. In other cases succession is governed by the law of the State of which at the
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of a citizen's habitual residence governs the estate of a citizen whose
principal place of residence is abroad provided she has lived there for over
five years, unless she evidently was associated more closely with the nation
of her citizenship.
83 
Article 3(3) applies to a decedent who dies subse-
quent to a short-term foreign residence of less than five years. Under this
section, the law of the decedent's nationality is employed, unless the
decedent was more closely associated with another state.s In other
words,
[i]n the absence of testamentary direction, the basic choice of law
rule of the Convention provides that the substantive aspects of a
decedent's estate shall be governed by the law of the State of the
decedent's habitual residence, if evidenced by five years continu-
ous residence or if the State of habitual residence is also the State
of the deceased's nationality.8'
Article 5 is the most significant provision for estate planners because
it empowers the testator with a limited right to choose either the law of the
state (professio juris) of her habitual residence or of her nationality to
administer the major components of succession to her estate.' The civil
time of his death the deceased was a national, unless at that time the deceased was
moe closely connected with another State, in which case the law of the latter State
applies.
Hague Conference on Succesion, supra note 2, art. 3.
83. See id.
84. Id. Generally, this rule seems to contemplate the wishes of most people residing abroad
for a short time; at least insofar as it pertains to people who originally are citizens and
domiciliaries of the same nation, but who, shortly thereafter, die while abroad. Id An
immigrant who is in the process of becoming a United States citizen, however, will have the
law of her new domicile apply to administer her estate. Id. The exception contained in
paragraph 3 is devised so as to accommodate this. Scoles memorandum 1, supra note 13, at
3.
85. Meworandum from Eugene F. Scoles to Author (October 30, 1989) at 3. (discussing
Hague Conference on Succession) [hereinafter Sales memorandum l]. Although the five-year
limitation may not be satisfied, them osists an exception protecting the "true" immigrant. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. Article 5 states:
1. A person may designate the law of a particular State to govern the succession
to the whole of his estate. The designation will be effective only if at the time of
the designation or of his death such person was a national of that State or had his
habitual residence them.
2. This designation shall be epressed in a statement made in accordance with the
formal requirements for dispositions of property upon death. The existence and
material validity of the act of designation are governed by the law designated. If
under that law the designation is invalid, the law goveming the succession is
determined ander Article 3.
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law countries, where the concept is largely unknown, found this "testator
autonomy" difficult to accept." At the same time, testamentary control
was important to common law countries that recommended the estate
planning necessity of being able to designate the governing law with some
certainty.
8 The resulting compromise was that a testator may only
designate the law of his nationality or the law of habitual residence to
govern the indefeasible rights of family protection in her estate, but is free
to designate other law, for example, the situs, to govern aspects of the
disposition of particular assets." Mandatory family protection provisions
impose rigid restrictions on the testator's authority.'
m 
Resultingly, the
pertinent law under the Convention, or embraced by the testator, distin-
guishes family members possessing distinct rights; that law is applicable
3. The revocation of such a designation by its maker shall comply with the rutes
as to form applicable to the revocation of dispositions of property upon death.
4. [A] designation of the applicable law, in the absence of an express contrary
provision by the deceased, is to he construed as governing succession to the whole
of the estate of the deceased whether he died intestate or wholly or partially testate.
Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 5. By authority of this provision, the
indefeasible shares or interests, which members of a testator's family have in his or her estate,
can be subjected by the testator to either the law of his citizenship or the law of his habitual
residence. See id
Scoals memoruodum II, supra note 85, at 3; see Robertson, supra note 1, at 379. The
testator's control over choice of law, like control over dispositions by will, is not absolute (it
is restrained by the state's view that the testator must he just before he is generous and the law
of nearly all jurisdictions provides forced shares for some family members). Scales
memorandum I, supra note 13, at 2-3. In the United States, this family protection is most often
reflected in the spouse's forced share. Id at 3. It is generally agreed that the state with the
dominant interest in providing the spouse's forced share is the state of the decedent's domicile.
Id at 3-4. As was stated in the case of In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y. 2d 478, 485-86, 288
N.Y.S.2d 993, 998-99 (1968) ("As between two states, the law of that one which has the
predominant, if not the sole, interest in the protection and regulation of the rights of the person
or persons involved should, of course, be invoked."). See, e.g., Matter of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d
124, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967). But see Estate of Renard, 108 Misc.2d 31, 437 N.Y.S.2d 860
(198t).
87. See Scoles, supra note 4.
88. See Scales memorandum I, supra note 13, at 5.
89. I at 7. The drafters sought to grant people in international "situations" the right to
govern their activities as they saw fit, with some degree of certainty, before they die. Id.
However, this approach may be seen as controversial insofar as it permits a choice to be made
where that individual is "habitually resident in a state which is not that of his or her
nationality." Id. "A national living in his or her country has no right to designate another law."
Id. Thus, the designation will be permitted only if it pertains to the testator's whole estate and
if the law identified is, in fact, the law of the testator's nationality or habitual residence at the
time the designation was made, or, at time of death. Id.
90. See Scoles memotnmdum I1, supra note 85, at 3.
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to all assets of the estate, barring, however, the testator's absolute
preference as to other affairs relating to specific assets.? Accordingly,
a choice of law clause in the testator's will will not allow indirectly what
is precluded directly. Consequently, article 5 (1 )fl was designed to permit
the testator to choose the law applicable to the whole of his estate only if
she was either a national or habitual resident of that state at the time of
designation or at the time of death."
5
Under article 6, a testator may select various laws to apply to different
parts of her estate.
4 
Article 6 permits an estate owner to designate the
law of any state to govern the succession of particular assets, but she
cannot override the mandatory rules of family protection that would be
applicable via article 3, if no testamentary direction is made, or the law of
her nationality or habitual residence as designated under article 5.
Article 7() maintains that the relevant law under either article 3 or 5
governs the entire estate notwithstanding the location of the assets,
excluding specific assets indicated under article 6.' The testator's
91. Id This guarantees that the corresponding heirs, pouses, and legatees are selected in all
states that are members of the Convention, a critical point in the consolidation of persons
interested in the estate. Id
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. Id. Providing the alternative of either nationality or habitual residence is part of the same
compromise reflected earlier in article 3 between domicile and nationality. See supra notes 82-
84 and accompanying text. These alternatives would seem to aecommodate essentially all
reasonable choices which a teastater might wish to make of the law applicable to all assets in
the estate. Id
94. Article 6 provides: "A person may designate the taw of one or more States to govern
the succession to particular assets in his estate. However, any such designation is without
prejudice to the application of the mandatory ules of the law applicable according to Article
3 or Article 5, paragraph ." Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 6. This right
may include a reference to the law of the situs of reat property if that is desired by the testator.
See id.
95. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 4. "This approach is familiar to American
lawyers and is reflected in the Uniform Probate Code § 2-602." id. The testator's authority to
delineate the law of a specific state simplifies instituting the proposed estate. Scoles
memorandum II, supra note 85, at 8. "While the prof i juris will probably be expressed in
most instances in a will, it need not be an instroment disposing of property but may be any
instrument executed in accordance with the formal requirements for distributions of property
upon death. Revocation of such adesignation also mst comply with the law applicable to the
revocation of dispositions of property upon death." Id.
96. Article 7 provides:
1. Subject to Article 6, the applicable law under Articles 3 and 5, paragraph 1,
governs the whole of the estate of the deceased wherever the assets are located.
2. This law governs -
a. the determination of the heirs, devisees and legatees, the respective
[Vol. 12
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prerogative, under article 6, to choose the law applicable to certain assets
might possibly encompass a reference to the law of the situs of real
property, if the testator so prefers. This provision especially is apropos
in view of article 7 because it clarifies the breadth of the Convention's
operation to assetss" This "unity" concept maintains that the same law
should apply to the whole estate except as otherwise provided by the
testator." This provision facilitates the task of ascertaining the law
applicable to the estate assets and to the corresponding parties under the
same circumstances, irrespective of the location of the assets" for "[t]he
fortuity of location of assets should not vary what family members receive
in relation to each other."'
0 
This entails only a slight modification
because the Convention only considers the shares family members acquire
in the decedent's estate"s and "does not reach administration of the
decedent's estate, rights of creditors, recording statutes, taxes, form of wills
or procedural matters. In fact, the only issue of genuine significance under
the [C]onvention is the identification of the law governing forced shares,
i.e., family protection."" In this particular area of succession, the
shares of those persons and the obligations imposed upon them by the
deceased, as well as other succession rights arising by reason of death
including provision by a court or other authority out of the estate of the
deceased in favor of persons close to the deceased;
b. disinheritance and disqualification by conduct;
C. ay obligation to restore or account for gifts, advancements ce
legacies when determining the shares of beirs, devisecs or legalc;
d. the disposable part of the estate, indefeasible interests and other
restrictions on dispositions of property upon death;
e. the material validity of testamentary dispositions.
Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 7; Scales memorandum 1, supra note 13,
at4.
97. Scoles memorandum II, supra note 85, at 8.
98. Id. at 8-9.
99. Scales memorandum 1, supru note 13, at 4.
100. Scoles memorandum II, supra note 85, at 9.
101. Scoles memorandum 1, supra 13, at 4. Such a concept might appear inapposite to
common law attorneys who are accustomed to simply assuming that the law of the situs is
employed with respect to all matters concerning real property. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Furthermore, it may he interpreted to limit the Convention to matters of substance,
leaving procedure for the courts. Id For example, the law determines the rights of heirs,
devisees and legatees, including whether they may have been disinherited or disqsalified by
conduct, as well as matters relating to advancements or other accounting for gifts in the
determination of their shares. See supra note 97 at accompanying text.
Additionally, curiosity may exist as to the Convention's impact on the difficulty of
proving foreign law. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 8. However,"[plroof of foreign
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
states' primary consideration is to secure any and all indefeasible interests
given to family members." Thus, the Convention simply integrates
these concerns into the heart of the decedent's family life at either her
habitual residence or place of nationality.
m
This restricted scope of the Convention materializes in article 7 (2 ),"t
6
which outlines the concerns underlying the law governed by the Conven-
tion."
e
o It also applies the governing law to limitations on the testamen-
tary power of the deceased and to the material validity of testamentary
dispositions." Article 7(3) authorizes the courts to broaden the law
under the Convention to encompass additional circumstances that it deems
should properly be administered by the law of succession.tea
B. Chapter 3
The Convention also covers agreements relating to succession, but not
limited to the contract to will or contract not to revoke a will, which are
not well regarded estate planning tools in the United States.' Contracts
law is a matter of procedure governed by the forum and not touched by the Convention." Id
(emphasis added). Proof of foreign law is varied among the methods employed by the
individual states of the United States, however, the distinct tendency is'toward procedures
whereby the court, when made aware that a claim is based on foreign law, can take judicial
notice or accept any available evidence of the content of the foreign law," Md
If proof of the foreign law is unavailable or fails, the courts of the United States generally
have relied upon four presumptions: (1) that the foreign law is based on the common law and
is thus the same as the common law of the forum; (2) the foreign law is the same as forum law;
(3) the foreign law is based on generally recognized principles of law common to civilized
nations; or (4) that the parties acquiesced in the application of forum law in the alternative. See
E. Scot.Es & S. HAY, CONFLICT o LAws § 12.19 (1982).
104. Scoles memorandum II, supra note 85, at 9.
105. Id. This approach is consistent with the legislative trend in the United States in the
UNI. PROB. CODE § 2-201 (1982) and in the N.Y. EsT. PoweRs & TRusTs LAw § 5-1.1(d)(8)
(Consol. 1986).
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. Soles memorandum II, supra note 85, at 9.
108. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 4-5.
109. Scoles memorandum II, supra note 85, at 10. "This enables a forun to accommodate
its view of that gray area between substance and procedure, but not to avoid the application of
the Convention to matters which are specifically identified in Article 7, paragraph 2." id.
110. See Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 5. These provisions ace aimed at
arrangements originated in writing or those arising from mutual wills which alter the future
estate of parties to the contract. Scoles memorandum II, supra note 85. at 10.
The basic approach ... is to provide that the validity of an agreement relating to
succession is, absent contrary direction by the parties, to be governed by the law
which would be applicable to the estate of the person involved as if that person had
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among family members in civil law countries are more customary and
more highly developed in comparison with Anglo-American common law
states, and therefore it was notably onerous to formulate this section of the
Convention."' Estate planning policies further led to a provision
authorizing the contracting parties to select the controlling law from the
states among which the estate owner(s) are either nationals or habitual
residents."' Articles 8 through 12 coordinate the law applicable to such
contractual arrangements with that identified for succession."3
C. Problems Posed by the Hague Convention
Some may insinuate that the Convention depicts a rudimentary change
in American law. Nevertheless, the Convention secures considerable
improvements in the context of international testation insofar as it unifies
the law for American citizens and American attorneys with only nominal
modifications in the prevailing law, resulting in clarity of the law."
4
Numerous estate plans hinge on choice of law clauses." 5 The Conven-
tion affords extreme international acknowledgment of choice of law
provisions in estate plans"' and while "the choice of law clause is
routinely used and enforceable in the United States, it is not so widely
accepted in many other countries. The Convention would extend that
acceptance. This, alone, is worth the modest concessions to civil law
concepts found in the Convention." "'
died on the date of the agreement. If the agreement involves the estate of only one
person, it is also valid if it is valid by the law which is applicable to the succession
of that person at the time that person actually dies.
Scoles memorandum II, supra note 85, at 10. The latter alternative is not applicable to
contracts correlated to multiple estates. Id
"The parties may, by express designation, subject the validity and effect of a contract
relating to succession to the law of the State in which any one of the persons whose future
estate is involved has his habitual residence or nationality at the time the agreerent is made."
Id. These party autonomy provisions are harmonious with the Convention's estate planning
approach, insofar as they afford the decedent the opportunity to make a pragmatic, foreseeable
identification of the law incident to an inter vims transaction. Id  at 10-11.
111. Scoles memorandum 1, supes note 85, at 4.
112. Id
113. See Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, arts. 8-12.
114. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 7.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. "Of course, some oppose law improvement simply because of inertia, but inertia in
this ease is costly and leads to lessened recognition of American law abroad." Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. . INT'L & COMP. L.
Article 22 is a transitional clause and provides for the Convention's
application by a contracting nation to estates of persons who die after the
convention enters into force for that nation."' Previously executed
choice of law designations either in wills or contracts are valid if consistent
with articles 5 or 11, respectively.
119 In view of the alternatives available
to the estate owner under the Convention, it is improbable that any adverse
effect will occur with existing estate plans which are unchanged.
20
As stated above, the word "domicile" has a separate meaning in
Europe than it does in the United States.
2
' The American theory is
focused on the counterpart to one's "home.
" " In order "[t]o avoid
distasteful problems of English domicile, more recent legislation in the
European Economic Community and the Hague Conventions have utilized
the term 'habitual residence.'"'
2 
Although the term has no definite
meaning, it is employed in the Convention inasmuch as it distinguishes the
core of the decedent's life, as disclosed by an individual's endeavors.'
24
By adopting the single reference to habitual residence, or secondarily,
to nationality, for all assets, the Convention declines to accept the scission
or dual rule of traditional Anglo-American choice of law.
23 This
118. Article 22 states:
1. The Convention applies in a Contracting State to the succession of any person
whose death occurs after the Convention has entered into force for that State.
2. Where at a time prior to the entry into force of the Convention in that State the
deceased has designated the law applicable to his succession, that designation is to
be considered valid them if it complies with Article 5.
3. Where at a time prior to the entry into force of the Convestion in that State the
parties to an agreement as to succession have designated the law applicable to that
agreement, that designation is to be considered valid there if it complies with
Article 11.
Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 22.
119. See generally Hague Conference on Sucession, supra note 2.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 16. Anglo-American countries rely heavily upon the deceased person's
domicile, which may be changed quickly and easily, while many civil law countries rely on
nationality, a concept which is more persistent and difficult to change. Scoles memorandum
I, supra note 13, at 7-8.
122. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 7.
123. Id. (Referring to, for example, Hague Convention on Child Abduction, arts. 3-4, 8,
ratified by the United States in 1988.) Notwithstanding this treaty, the term "hobitual
residence" is not yet customary in United States conflict of laws jargon. Id In the Conference
debates, the meaning of "habitual residence" is primarily comparable to that which American
attorneys refer to as domicile. See Scoles, Choice ofLaw in Family Property Transactions, 209
REctIuL DES COURS 9, 24 (1988-1); cf E. SCOLES & S. HAY, rapra note 105.
124. Scoles memorandum 1, supra note 13, at 8 (citing D. Waters, Report, Succession §§
10-1l, Prel. Doc. 12, HCOPIL Mar. 1988).
125. See Memorandum from Peter W. Salsich, Jr. to Max Gutierrez, Jr. & John S.
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advancement appears to be quite beneficial. Application of the situs rule
is distinctively restricted to instances where there is no conflict, such as the
decedent's residence at her domicile, or at other homes elsewhere.t"
Resultingly, inordinate amounts of time are spent handling "non-domicili-
ary real property" in the decedent's estate, when compared to its actual
value.
27 
Nevertheless, there is a considerable risk that an unforeseen
distortion in current estate planning will arise as a consequence of applying
the situs rule to investments because current investments associated with
real property take numerous forms.'
12  
Methods of recording or ascertain-
ing title to land are not dealt with by the members of the Convention." 9
Moreover, the Convention does not consider the taxation or improvement
of land, or the purpose for which the land is being used.
1
te Rather, the
Convention only identifies the law that establishes who takes and in what
proportion.
13  
For example, "[i]f the estate owner dies testate, the
Convention identifies the law, usually of [the decedent's] domicile, which
governs [her] will, but the will determines the shares [her] successors take
from the estate, including . . . land wherever it may be located."'32
Under the Convention, one law will apply to the inventory of movable
Hollyfield, Co-Chairs, Task Force on Succession (March 9, 1990) at 4-5 [hereinafter Salsich
memorandum]. The common law courts maintained the traditional scission approach, by which
the law of the situs governs issues concerning land, while the law of the decedent's domicile
governs all movable assets of the decedent's estate. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 85, at
5. In contrast, most civil law countries have typically employed a "unitary" approach, thereby
applying the law of the decedent's nationality to all of the decedent's assets, irrespective of
whether they are movable or immovable. Id.
126. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 9.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
129. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 9. This is so because the situs state has a
considerable stake in the succession of a decedent's estate, including "establishing a reasonably
clear and fair system for resolving conflicts, maintaining the integrity of the public land records
system, maintaining a tax base for property taxes that is commensusate with the needs of the
state, and exercising police power controls over the use of loud." Salsich memorandum, supra
note 125, at 2.
130. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13.
131. Id.
132. Id. The law in the United States can best be perceived in this regard. Id. If a spouse,
for exarssple, has a forced share in a decedent's estate which cannot under any circumstances
be nullified, the Convention provides the law to determine that spouse's exact share. Id.
This method, according to Professor Scoles, is consistent with the UNMi. PROB. CODE §
2-201. Id. Further, it is consistent with the purpose of applying the law of the state
predominately concerned with the family to beth mal and personal property as the estate is
treated as a unit. See J. ScHOENLuM, MuLTISTATE & MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING,
§ 10.03 (2d ed, 1982).
196 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 12
assets, simplifying the lawyer's task."' If the decedent dies intestate, the
same approach is followed for all assets. In other words, the law of the
habitual residence will apply."
As a further benefit, the Convention alleviates the problems of
characterizing assets as real or personal, movable or immovable.
3 
This
so-called "scission" in Anglo-American conflict of laws rules has created
much frustration and skepticism, resulting in needless litigation.
36 
The
question arises, for example, as to whether "an investment in a partnership
holding land, oil royalties, land under contract for deed, a condominium,
a cooperative apartment, a real estate investment trust, or a mortgage or
mortgage pool, should be considered real property, the location of which
will determine the spouse's forced share."
33 
Under the traditional situs
rule, atypical results have occurred in similar cases.
t3 
Whether one
agrees or disagrees with the outcome of the cases, the uncertainty of the
results of litigation on this point can simply be avoided by the unified
application of the single reference under the Convention.'
39 
Organiza-
tions attempting to maintain uniformity among the states as to conflict of
laws rules, however, confront problems with the aforementioned ap-
proach.
1
"s Courts have avoided using the "situs rule," as it is not as
monolithic as it is presumed to be.
4
' For example, succession is one
133. Scales memorandum 11, supra note 85, at 6.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See Scoles, supra note 4.
137. Id at 58. It is offensive to most spouses and children that their interests may be
decided by the law of the place where decedent had business holding, usually arranged by mail
or telephone and usually relating to land in a place with which neither the family nor the
decedent had any meaningful connection. Id. Clearly, mast people would expect their interests
to be determined by the law of the place where the decedent and family resided and made their
home. See id.
138 See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARIES ON CONFuCT OF LAwS §§ 8.1-8.22 (3d d. 1986).
Even states endorsing the principle of scission have perceived growing complications with the
mechanical application of the lex situs with respect to immovables and were prepared to move
towards applying one single law, as long as precautions were taken so as to maintain the use
of distinct policy rules which pertain to immovables. van Loon, spra note I, at 275.
139. See Scoles, supra note 4, at 58.
140. See Reese, supra note 1, at 884.
141. See id. at 885-86. Each state has its own approaches to and preconceptions of the
subject. Few states will be inclined to agree to any complete departure from their existing rules
and principles. Id. at 884.
Either the provisions of a convention are likely to be so broad as to afford only a
general guide to decisions, and hence to be unsuitable for a convention designed to
achieve uniformity of result in Some area of conflict of laws, or by reason of their
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field in which there has been a notable digression.
42
A primary objective of the Convention is to reduce the difficulties
facing both clients and attorneys who deal with international estates.'
43
Because the Convention's provisions closely parallel existing estate
planning practices, it should facilitate present planning techniques and
make their enforcement more assured.
t
" The Convention does not apply
to non-probate transfers4 5 and does not preclude the application of other
law to testamentary trusts.'
4  
The identified law will safeguard most
estate plans.
147 
As indicated above, there are no major changes in the tax
or procedural aspects of probate administration resulting from the
Convention.'
4
Inter vivos transactions are extremely commonplace in the United
States because they have important tax consequences. They are not
included in the decedent's gross estate and are thus excluded from any tax
liability.'
49 
Significant economic incidents arise at the death of an estate
owner.' Therefore, in order to protect inter vivos transactions, there
was a "forceful and persistent effort by the Anglo-American delegates to
the Hague Conference that resulted in the express exclusion of these types
precision, it may be feared that the provisions would compel the courts to reach
nfavorable results in situations that either are known or, although currently
unfoseen, would fall within their literal scope of application.
Id. at 885-86.
142. See R. WEiNTPAun s pra note 142; see also Scotes, supra note 125, at 67. Most
scholars have advocated its abandonment in favor of a more functional approach. See R.
WETRAuB, supra note 142, at § 8.21A. In an area of choice of law, where ie only truly
sensitive iue is that of family protection, it is submitted that the unitary reference is preferable
to the application of the situs rule. Id
143. See Salsich memorandum, supra note 125, at 3.
144. See id.
145. See supra note 11.
146. Article 14 coordinates this Convention on succession with the Trust Convention as
follows: "1. Where a trust is created in a disposition of property upon death, the application to
the succession of the law determined by the Convention does not preclude the application of
another law to the trust." Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. 14, at 151.
"Thus, if a testamentary trust is established by a decedent's will, the Succession Convention
would apply to those succession issues which would arise under the will but a different law
could be designated by the testator to govern administration of the trust." Scoles memorandumn
It, supra note 85, at 11.
147. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 11.
148. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
149. See I.R.C. § 2031 (1986).
150. Scoles memorandum t, supra note 13, at 11.
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of transactions from the Convention." 51  Accordingly, the Convention
is limited in scope to assets passing through the decedent's estate by will,
intestacy, or mandatory forced share provision.'
t 2 
This limitation is
important because it maintains the reliance on inter vivos transactions,
thereby protecting the decedent's intentions."
5 3 
In acknowledging a
separate governing law for trusts, article 14 simplifies the employment of
inter vivos trusts, pour-over wills,
5 4 
and testamentary trusts."ts
V. ADVANTAGES OF A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL WELL FORM
The first advantage of a uniform will form, especially to attorneys who
practice in the field of international estate planning, is the clarity and
simplicity that it offers in handling the estate.
5 6 
Simplicity promotes
utilization of the will form, for if it is to be effective it is necessary that it
appeal to testators.'
7
With respect to Americans possessing assets abroad, the uniform will
immensely reduces the necessity of researching and deciphering foreign
choice of law rules or the need to actually draft a will in accordance with
a particular country's laws.'58 Multiple wills may tend to minimize the
problem of conflict of laws. However, the potential problems that may
arise from multiple wills are endless. For example, there may be
complications associated with the debts and estate administration duties that
result from the requisite separate administration.' t
The foreign will may raise difficulties vis-a-vis the domestic will if
there are inconsistencies or ambiguities between the two or if a court
151. Id.; see Hague Conference on Succession, supra note 2, art. I (2)(d), at 150.
152. ld.; see supra notes 78-115 and accompanying text.
153. Scoles memorandum I, supra note 13, at 11.
154. Pour-over is a provision in a will which directs the distribution of property into a aust.
BLACK's LAW DICrTIoNARY 1052 (5th ed. 1979).
155. Scoles memorandum 1, supra note 13, at 11. A further consideration of the delegates'
attempt to limit the Convention solely to incidents of succession. Id.; see supra note 148 and
accompanying text.
156. Note, supra note 26, at 331.
157. Id. It seems logical that formal requirements of a will should be minimal if they ane
to be the "preferred" vehicle for disposing of the decedent's property. Id.; see Nadelmann,
supra note 57, at 372.
158. Note, supra note 26, at 331; Brandon, supra note 73, at 745.
159. Note, sapra note 26, at 331; see Hall, supra note 61, at 885; see also Lowethal v.
Rome, 57 Md. App. 726, 471 A.2d 1102 (1984).
1990] HAGUE CONFERENCE & U.S. ESTATE PLANNING 199
merely has trouble comprehending the foreign willito This problem
could easily be avoided if testators were not required to write more than
one will to govern the disposition of their assets. The uniform will form
would facilitate the time consuming and intricate task of judges in
ascertaining the validity of the terms of foreign will provisions, as welt as
saving the estate the accompanying expenses.'
6
'
Foreigners living in this country would also benefit from the uniform
international will. Respecting the testamentary wishes of foreigners
holding property in the United States is "good policy,"'
62 
for to do
otherwise would impede the foreign investment on which the United States
depends. '" International will uniformity would exist for the first time
in the United States since people would rely, with certainty, on the form
to be respected in places other than their own domicile.'
There would also be fewer will contests as a result of the "certainty
of disposition."'" The foreign character of a foreign will induces parties
to challenge it insofar as there is confusion about its terms or the
cognizance that a court may distort the instrument in their favor.'" This
has been a perpetual and costly problem, for will contests lead to the
diminution of estates.'
67 
The potential expense of retaining foreign
lawyers and, if necessary, foreign expert witnesses is substantial.'" This
cost could be entirely avoided with the adoption of the Uniform Intema-
tional Will.
Time is yet another factor for consideration. As a result of the rapid
fluctuations in currency exchange rates in today's world, the speedy
administration of estates involving foreign property is critical.'"
160. Note, supra note 26, at 331.
161. Id. at 331-32; see Hall, supra note 61, at 854-55.
162. Hall, supra note 61, at 854-55.
163. Id. Foreigners emigrating to the United States expecting to become United States
citizens would also benefit from the uniform will form. Id.
164. S. Doec. No. 385-17, 99th Cong., 2d Seas. 3 (1986).
165. Note, supra note 26, at 332. "Because of the simple reqirements for validity and the
likelihood that the will would be in the native tongue of the testator, the terms of a testator's
international will would be much less susceptible to attack than would a foreign will." Id.
166. Id. There in a strong public policy rationale in favor of reducing the number of potential
will contests because they tend heedlessly to exhaust resources. Id Additionally, will contests




169. Hall, supra note 61, at 851 (commenting that the practice of the rich is to devise
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Additionally, the emotional pain that is experienced by the decedent's
family while waiting for a will to be admitted to probate can be somewhat
alleviated, if not obliterated altogether, by the adoption of a Uniform
International Will.
VI. CONCLUSION
Problems in the area of succession of property upon the death of the
owners have been a substantial concern of the international community for
years. Insofar as succession of family property is intimately tied to local
societal views of the family, the substantive laws differ from nation to
nation, rendering unification very difficult and improbable. Courts have
tended to apply their own domestic law. This has led to many will
contests raising questionable jurisdictional theories involving costly and
extensive negotiation or litigation.
These problems have become magnified due to the increasing mobility
of capital and persons, the ease of communication, and the global
economy. The number of estates of deceased persons for which more than
one legal system may be applicable is growing and is likely to increase
even further in the future.
70 
Foreign investment continues to grow and,
thus, testators deserve the same testamentary protection for their foreign
assets as they receive for their domestic assets. If adopted, the Uniform
International Will would encourage, if not ensure, the testator that her
wishes would be respected. The adoption of the uniform will provides a
way to solve these difficulties because it uses choice of law rules to
identify a single law to govern the whole estate as a unit.
The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the
Estates of Deceased Persons illustrates the opportunity for a genuine
advancement in the private international law governing decedents' estates.
The Convention represents a workable compromise between two major
choice of law approaches. The general approach of the Convention may
prove useful to many United States citizens, insofar as it would establish
uniform regulations, virtually assuring testators that their assets will be
revocable tusts). Apparently, it is feasible to make, as well as lose, money in currency
fluctuations. See id Nonetheless, it is inappropriate to succumb the testator's estate to the
vagaries of currency exchange. See id.
170. See van Loon, supra note 1, at 275. This is due to the increased migration of workers,
growth in the number of multinational marriages, increased movement of refugees, acquisition
of primary or secondary residences in countries with a favorable climate, increasing
transnational investment, and a growing number of pcstings for employment in foreign countries
created by multinationals and international organiztions. Id.
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distributed in accordance with their wishes. It provides instructive
guidance by which persons and courts can easily identify the applicable
law in most cases, without delay or litigation. This ease in determining
and predicting the applicable law in international estates and estate
planning transactions for both outgoing and incoming members of our
population should provide assurance to international itinerants and the
attorneys who advise them. United States attorneys in particular should
find the Convention valuable because they are constantly faced with
perplexing choice of law doctrines and doubt as to predictably reliable
means of resolving the issues.
Adoption of the Convention by the United States will not only
manifest its seriousness in participating in international agreements, but
will also provide a solution to an ever-increasing problem among United
States citizens with contacts abroad.
Lisa N. Frankel

